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The purpose of this research is to determine the contract management process 
maturity level of the 918th Contracting Battalion and 410th Contracting Support Brigade 
utilizing the Contract Management Maturity Model. The Mission and Installation 
Contracting Command (MICC) is undergoing a significant change in structure known as 
MICC 2025. In order to gauge the effectiveness of this plan, this report analyzes those 
proposed changes. The 918th Contracting Battalion is part of the MICC, while the 410th 
Contracting Support Brigade is part of the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) 
and not undergoing the same changes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the research project. First, we provide 
background information on the subject, followed by the purpose of this research. Next, 
we present the research questions to be answered and the methodology used to conduct 
the research. We then present the benefits and the limitations of the research. To 
conclude, a summary of the chapter and an overview of the organization of the report are 
given. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Department of Defense (DOD) contracting has been an important issue for more 
than 20 years, according to its placement on the Government Accountability Office’s 
(GAO’s) high risks report in 1992 and its continued status in the report as of 2015 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). The increased operational tempo 
following the events of 9/11 has placed added pressure on the contracting workforce, 
both deployed and in garrison. The changing operational tempo coupled with the 
changing fiscal environment has also affected contracting manpower (Gabbert, 2015). 
Sequestration has resulted in decreased manpower and more frequent workforce turnover, 
which places a strain on organizational and individual knowledge retention. Individual 
and organizational knowledge in the form of mature processes is one way to ensure that 
knowledge is not lost through personnel attrition. The Contract Management Maturity 
Model (CMMM) developed by Rendon (2003) has been used successfully by many DOD 
organizations as a way to gauge the maturity of organizational contracting processes, and 
perhaps more importantly, to identify best practices that can be passed from organization 
to organization.   
This research applies the CMMM to two contracting units within the U.S. Army, 
the 410th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) and the 918th Contracting Battalion 
(CBN). These units were chosen in part by the request of the Mission Installation 
Contracting Command (MICC) commander in an effort to gauge the progress of a new 
initiative, MICC 2025. The 918th CBN falls under the MICC and has been identified as 
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having progressed the furthest in the implementation of MICC 2025. The 410th CSB falls 
under the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and is not part of the MICC 2025 
initiative. 
MICC 2025, under implementation since February 2014, includes two primary 
changes that attempt to streamline the acquisition process throughout the MICC with a 
smaller workforce, the popular “do more with less” philosophy (Gabbert, 2015). The first 
change affects structure. Historically, each office under the MICC was a full-service 
contracting office. Under the plan, the organizational structure is shifting from full-
service offices to six “centers” with 26 “satellites” (Gabbert, 2015). This change in 
structure leads to the second change, the change in function. As stated, not all offices will 
be full service under MICC 2025. The satellite offices will perform local contracting for 
amounts less than the simplified acquisition threshold, $150,000. In essence, they will 
conduct the more simple contracting functions and pass on the more complex actions to 
the center to which they are assigned. In this way, the offices and their employees can 
become more specialized.   
B. PURPOSE 
The changes under way within the MICC have the potential to produce many best 
practices that can be used throughout the Army, the DOD, and the federal government as 
a whole. This research attempts to answer the question of whether the structural and 
functional changes resulting from MICC 2025 are having an impact on the contracting 
process maturity of its organizations. 
The purpose of this research is to measure the maturity level of contracting 
processes in the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB by utilizing the CMMM in an effort to 
compare and contrast the results for each organization. The comparisons can then be used 
to gauge the potential impact of MICC 2025 and identify process improvement 
opportunities. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The results of the CMMM process assessment identify maturity levels for each 
organization in terms of the six key contracting process areas and answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What is the contract management process maturity level for the 918th 
Contracting Battalion in each of the six contract management process 
areas? 
2. What is the contract management process maturity level for the 410th 
Contracting Support Brigade in each of the six contract management 
process areas? 
3. What opportunities for process improvement are available for the 410th 
Contracting Support Brigade and the 918th Contracting Battalion based on 
the CMMM assessment results? 
4. Are the MICC 2025 changes being implemented within Army contracting 
having an impact on contract management process maturity? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
For this research, we utilized the CMMM to assess the process maturity levels of 
the two Army contracting organizations. The CMMM by Rendon (2003) involves a 
62-question online survey that was deployed to the leadership of each contracting 
organization. Utilizing an online version of the survey allowed for instant feedback and 
the ability to track the response rate in real time. The leadership then distributed the 
survey to the workforce for completion. 
We used a purposeful sampling method in which the survey was deployed only to 
experienced 1102 and military-equivalent contracting professionals. The experience 
requirements for survey respondents included Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II certification in contracting. The survey was 
designed to be answered by employees who have contracting experience and are 
knowledgeable with the organization’s contract management processes. Employees with 
less contracting experience and less knowledge of the organization’s processes are more 
likely to respond with “I don’t know” answers to survey questions, which can skew the 
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results and decrease the validity of the assessment. For this reason, the supervisors were 
asked to deploy the survey to their contracting workforce certified at Level II and above. 
We then analyzed the results of the survey to determine the maturity levels of the 
organizations’ contract management processes in the six key process areas. The maturity 
levels range from Ad-Hoc to Optimized and are explained in detail in Chapter II. The 
assessment results of the two organizations were then compared to determine whether 
any consistencies exist. Differences in assessment results between the organizations are 
then used to gain insight on whether MICC 2025 is indeed having an impact on contract 
management process maturity. The assessment results of both organizations are also used 
to identify key process areas that require extra attention and those that are rated as mature 
and could potentially be studied as best practices to be shared across the Army, the DOD, 
and the federal government. 
E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The results of this research will initially benefit the 918th CBN and the 410th 
CSB with the potential to further benefit Army Contracting Command (ACC). The 
analyzed data will provide windows into each organization’s processes as each of the six 
contracting key process areas are assigned a maturity level. The maturity levels identify 
which process areas are more capable and could potentially be used as best practices 
throughout Army higher echelons as well as identify the process areas that are not as 
capable and could use process improvement. 
The assessment results will then be used to compare and contrast the two 
organizations. The intent is to gauge the effectiveness of the MICC’s new MICC 2025 
initiative. Data that shows that maturity levels are much higher in the 918th CSB may 
imply that the changes implemented under MICC 2025 are having a positive impact. 
Conversely, if the 410th CBN maturity levels prove to be higher, then the data may 
provide areas that require more focus within the new initiative. In either case, best 
practices and problem areas will be identified for each organization. 
This research provides a baseline of study for MICC 2025. As the name implies, 
the initiative will not be complete until 2025. This study will provide an initial look at the 
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impact of change within the MICC. As the MICC progresses toward its goals, additional 
research may be done to document its improvement or decline. Each additional study of 
MICC 2025 could also be compared to the many organizations that have already been 
analyzed using the CMMM. Should MICC 2025 prove to be a success, the data collected 
through this and additional research will provide key process areas that can be used as 
other contracting organizations throughout the Army and the DOD transform.  
F. LIMITATIONS TO RESEARCH 
The primary limitations of this research are related to the use of a survey to 
collect data. The research relies heavily on the organizations’ chains of command. The 
survey must be sent to the eligible employees in order to receive usable data, and it is of 
the utmost importance that the chains of command support participation in the study. 
Low percentages of participation would have negative consequences to the validity of the 
study. This research is also dependent on the effort and honesty of its participants. Time 
constraints, interest, and many other distractors that result from human study can also 
limit the accuracy of the data. 
Finally, while the CMMM process does identify the maturity levels of key 
process areas in an organization, it does not identify the reasons that process areas are 
mature or otherwise. It is left to the leaders to discover what their organization does best 
in their mature areas and what requires improvement in the less mature process areas.   
G. SUMMARY 
Innovative and productive change within Army contracting is essential as it 
changes from years of war to a more garrison environment. Gabbert (2015) has identified 
this need as he instituted his MICC 2025 plan. Studying, documenting, and conducting 
research at a time of great change within an organization the size of the MICC provides a 
great opportunity to gain a wealth of knowledge in lessons learned and best practices. 
Much can be taken away from this process of change with continued analysis and 
documentation regardless of the program’s success. 
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This chapter began with a brief introduction and background of the research. We 
then listed the research questions that we hope to answer along with the purpose of the 
research. We then presented the organization of this research report, followed by a 
discussion on the methodology used for the research. Lastly, we identified and discussed 
the benefits and limitations of the research.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a 
literature review on organizational assessments used in government and business, the 
assessment of performance within the DOD, other uses of capability models, the current 
state of contract management within the DOD, and a look at the CMMM. In Chapter III, 
we take a closer look at U.S. Army contracting’s mission by laying out its structure down 
to the units under discussion, and providing an assessment of their current state. In 
Chapter IV, we provide the CMMM assessment results and provide recommendations for 
contract management process improvement opportunities. Chapter V concludes with a 
summary of the research and recommendations for further research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Mature organizational processes within DOD contract management agencies are 
essential in today’s fiscally constrained environment. In this chapter, we provide a 
literature review of material showing the importance of measuring process capability 
beginning with an overview of organizational assessments in general. We then detail 
assessment methods within the DOD and provide an assessment of the DOD’s current 
performance regarding contract management. The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
current use of capability models and an overview of the CMMM. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENTS 
The importance of knowing one’s organization cannot be overstated. 
Organizational assessment is often the catalyst for change (Lakos & Phipps, 2004). 
Assessment provides data that indicate where managers’ attention, resources, and 
priorities need to be focused (Lakos & Phipps, 2004). This is true whether culture, 
performance, individuals, or processes are being assessed. In any case, the focus can be 
placed on elements that the organization, or person, is doing well and those that require 
improvements. Cultural attributes, performance, or processes that have proven to be 
successful can then be used as best practices to improve the organization in other areas. 
As the famous Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu said, “He who knows others is wise; he who 
knows himself is enlightened” (Clark, 2009, p. 213). This holds true at the organizational 
level as well. 
The importance of organizational assessments and process improvement is no less 
important in the public sector than it is in the private sector. In the case of the public 
sector, taxpayers, elected officials, and government employees all have an interest in how 
well the government is performing (Piotrowski & Ansah, 2010). In the case of the private 
sector, the interested parties are employees, stockholders, customers, and potential 
investors. The results of effective assessments can either build or erode trust in the 
organization. In either case, there is value in the transparency of an organization. 
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Assessments are a sign that the organization has a desire to identify its weak points and 
build upon its strengths. A Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat (SWOT) analysis is 
an example of an assessment that does just that. Regardless of which type of 
organizational assessment is used, the use of an assessment is beneficial to all interested 
parties. This section focused on the importance of organization assessments; next, our 
discussion transitions to the organizational assessments currently used within the DOD. 
C. ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE DOD 
The DOD and the Army produce performance-oriented assessments in the form of 
Organizational Assessment Reports and the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). 
This section examines the two main assessment tools that are utilized. 
The Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) was established on 
October 17, 2008, through a DOD directive as a way to “better synchronize, integrate, 
and coordinate the business operations of the Department of Defense to ensure optimal 
alignment in support of the war fighting mission” (Office of the DCMO, n.d., p. 1). The 
DCMO is directed to conduct an annual organization assessment by Section 4315 of Title 
5, United States Code and other policy directives from the secretary of defense (Office of 
the DCMO, 2014). The output of this directive is the annual Organizational Assessment 
Report for the DOD. This report provides an organizational assessment of “annual 
performance results, pursuant to DOD’s Annual Performance Plan and other DOD-wide 
and DOD component-specific performance results” (Office of the DCMO, n.d., p. 1).  
One key section within the report that is acquisition related is DOD Strategic Goal 
5: “Reform the business and support functions of the defense enterprise” (Office of the 
DCMO, 2014, p. 19). This section has seven organizational performance measures that 
aim to “improve acquisition processes from requirements definition to the execution 
phase, to acquire military-unique and commercial items” (p. 21). The seven key 
organizational measurements and results utilized in this assessment are described in 
Appendix A (p. 21). This organizational assessment is most applicable to the present 
research project as it has specific acquisition and contracting performance measures.  
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The next type of organizational assessment performed by the Army is the OIP. 
The governing proponent of this inspection is the Army inspector general. The mission of 
the inspector general is to be the “eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the Army across 
the spectrum of operations and to conduct thorough, objective, and impartial inspections, 
assessments, and investigations” (U.S. Army, n.d.-c, p. 1). The Army inspector general 
works with commanders, state adjutants general, program managers, directors, staff 
principals, inspector generals (IGs), and all Army inspectors to ensure that the OIP is 
done within the standards set forth in accordance with Army Regulation 1–201 Army 
Inspection Policy (Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA], 2015). 
According to Headquarters, Department of the Army (2015) the basic purpose of 
the inspections is to provide the commander, director, program manager, and other 
interested parties with feedback so they can make decisions that will improve their 
organization. The Army OIP follows five basic principles and five basic elements that 
encompass the inspection. The basic principles include being purposeful, coordinated, 
focused on feedback, instructive, and diligent in following up with corrective actions 
taken (HQDA, 2015). Performance measurement, determination of problem severity, 
determination of underlying causes of the problem, formulating a solution, and finally 
giving ownership of the person in the best position to solve the problem make up the 
basic elements of the inspection (HQDA, 2015). The Army OIP is a useful tool for the 
present research project as it provides an individually tailored inspection for different 
types of organizations within the Army.  
The Air Force uses a specific self-inspection checklist to assess the performance 
of contracting organizations (see Appendix B). This checklist provides leadership of Air 
Force contracting organizations a way to measure and assess performance from a 
standardized checklist. A self-inspection checklist is one way to assess organizational 
performance; another way to assess organizational performance is the use of capability 
models to assess organizational capability. This section focused on current organizational 
assessments used within the DOD; next, our research transitions to the use of capability 
models for assessing process maturity. 
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D. CAPABILITY MODELS 
It has become more important than ever for both business and government to 
develop their core capabilities, given the global nature of the competitive environment. 
The difficulty lies in assessing which capabilities or processes require improvement, 
which can be used as a best practice, and which should be cut completely (Forstner, 
Kamprath, & Röglinger, 2014). Capability models are a way that management can assess 
their capabilities. The category in which the capabilities are placed is often according to 
the maturity level of the process, maturity meaning the level of development of the 
particular capability (Forstner et al., 2014). Such models are frequently used in 
information technology, and many areas of business such as project and strategic 
management (Forstner et al., 2014; Jokela, Siponen, Hirasawa, & Earthy, 2006). 
The DOD as well as industry recognized a need for process improvement in the 
realm of software development in 1986 (Paulk, 1993). The Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM), one of the original such models, was developed as a joint venture between the 
DOD and Carnegie Mellon University in the form of the Software Engineering Institute 
as a result of this need (Paulk, 1993). This model is similar to the one being used for this 
study. The CMM involves a questionnaire that is structured by key process areas that are 
evaluated according to their maturity level. The results are used to identify process areas 
that need improvement and those that can be used as building blocks. Paulk (1993) 
emphasized that while the questionnaire plays a large role in the model, it should not be 
the primary focus. He said the focus should be placed on the model itself as it provides 
developmental guidance. Furthermore, Paulk points out that “success that rests solely on 
the availability of specific individuals provides no basis for long-term productivity and 
quality improvement throughout an organization” (p. 18). In other words, individuals and 
their knowledge come and go; organizational progress and success are achieved through 
quality processes. The focus is on the model, and the model itself is focused on 
organizational process improvement, not improvement of the individual. This structure 
allows it to be transferred to any number of fields, to include contract management. 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) developed another model, the balanced scorecard, 
which provides insight into an organization’s progress toward its strategic goals. The 
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balanced scorecard utilizes a set of performance measures based on the organizations’ 
vision and strategy (Christesen, 2008). The data collected on these performance 
measurements are analyzed to ensure the organization is keeping pace with its stated 
goals. The balanced scorecard views the organization from four perspectives: 
financial/stewardship, customer/stakeholder, internal business process, and organizational 
capacity (Balanced Scorecard Institute, n.d.). The balanced scorecard has evolved from 
simply measuring performance. The data collected are often used to shape the strategy of 
the organization, making it an ever-changing process (Balanced Scorecard Institute, n.d.). 
The balanced scorecard is used widely in the DOD, and the GAO (2004) recommends its 
use as a management tool for measuring defense agency performance. 
Many examples of capability models are utilized by government and the private 
sector to include the Capability Maturity Model for software development and program 
management. The common theme throughout each model is the emphasis on knowing the 
organization. Without knowing where the organization is excelling or failing, it is almost 
impossible to improve. Constant improvement is necessary in today’s business 
environment. In the interest of improving Army contract management, the present study 
uses the CMMM, which builds upon the work of the Capability Maturity Model. The 
model can be used across the DOD to address problem areas that are discussed further in 
the next section. 
E. STATE OF DOD CONTRACT MANAGEMENT  
The DOD obligates over $300 billion in defense contracts each year through 
contracting (GAO, 2015). It is easy to recognize the importance of proficiency and 
efficiency in this arena. The reality is that the DOD as a whole is not performing well, 
according to the GAO. The functions of contracting and acquisition in DOD were first 
listed on the GAO’s High Risk List in 1992. The functions have remained there in each 
biennial report since and appear in the recent 2015 report due to deficiencies in managing 
service contracts, management of the acquisition workforce, and the integration of 
operational contracting in contingency operations (GAO, 2015). The GAO serves as the 
“watchdog” of government spending; just as the name implies, it holds the government 
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accountable for its actions. In the 2015 High Risk List, several areas require attention. 
Most are applicable to this research and reflect the DOD’s current performance needs. 
For example, the GAO (2015, p. 14) lists four areas requiring improvement in DOD 
contract management: “(1) the acquisition workforce, (2) contracting techniques and 
approaches, (3) service acquisitions, and (4) operational contract support.”   
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics’ 
(USD[AT&L]) Better Buying Power (BBP) provides potential remedies to many of the 
GAO’s recommendations (OUSD[AT&L], n.d.). BBP began in 2010 to serve as a best 
practices focal point for the DOD (Kendall, 2015). In the BBP initiatives, the 
USD(AT&L) highlights DOD acquisition areas of special emphasis for the upcoming 
years and actions required for success. BBP initiatives can be seen as a response to GAO 
recommendations and are highlighted in this section as well. 
The focus area of the acquisition workforce requires improvement in quality as 
well as quantity of personnel. The USD(AT&L) has set the workforce as a priority in its 
BBP initiative. Within BBP 2.0, which was released in 2013, the USD(AT&L) listed 
improving professionalism of the workforce as one of the seven focus areas (Kendall, 
2013). Within this focus area, there were the following initiatives aimed at success:  
“Establish higher standards for key leadership positions, increased professional 
qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties, increase the recognition and 
support of excellence in acquisition management, and continuing to increase the cost 
consciousness of the acquisition workforce-change the culture” (Kendall, 2013, p. 3). The 
USD(AT&L) continues this theme in BBP 3.0 with the initiative of  “improving the 
professionalism of the acquisition workforce” (Kendall, 2015, p. 2). 
Progress has been made in both quality and quantity in the acquisition workforce 
(GAO, 2015). The GAO High Risk List recognizes that the DOD has increased the size 
of the workforce by 14,000 in the last six years shows progress in the quantity category, 
but also recognizes that there is not currently an outlook or strategy for the ideal mix of 
civilian and military personnel. It also notes that there is no forecast for future strength or 
established budgeting for that strength. Recognition is also given to the efforts the DOD 
has placed on assessment of the workforce’s critical skills and competencies (GAO, 
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2015). Overall, the DOD has remedied 27 of 32 statutory reporting requirements with 
regard to the workforce (GAO, 2015).   
Contract techniques and approaches are a high point for the DOD, according to 
the GAO report. Contracting techniques and approaches are generally defined as the way 
in which the government acquires a good or service. These methods include the choice of 
whether to use a fixed-price contract or a cost reimbursement contract, and the actions 
necessary to ensure maximum competition in industry (GAO, 2015). The BBP initiative 
is again given credit for the progress made in this area. BBP 2.0 listed the promotion of 
effective competition and the improvement of tradecraft in acquisition of services as one 
of its primary initiatives (Kendall, 2013). The progress made through training and various 
assessments used to identify best practices has resulted in this portion of contract 
management being taken off of the high-risk list for 2015. 
The importance of contracting for services is shown by the fact that contracting 
constituted 50% of all DOD contracts in 2013 (GAO, 2015). Historically, as shown in the 
GAO’s report, the DOD has not had an integrated strategy or policy to support its 
contracting of services. The lack of data, both current and historical, makes it difficult to 
measure either progress or regression. Therefore, the success or failure of newly 
implemented policies and procedures cannot be accurately determined. The data that are 
missing include inventories of all contracted services and inventory of contractor 
personnel (GAO, 2015). The impact that this has on effective decision-making is evident. 
The lack of knowledge about the number of personnel, military or civilian, who manage 
service contracts, as well as not knowing the number of contracts that require managing 
results, is a strategic nightmare. 
Perhaps as a result of the GAO’s report, both BBP 2.0 and 3.0 include improving 
the tradecraft in acquisition of services as a primary initiative. The USD(AT&L)’s 
guidance is to improve the management of these contracts by including those outside the 
normal acquisition field (Kendall, 2015). Increased demand for services is at the base 
level where many services are outside the expertise and view of the actual contracting 
professional and therefore require expertise and oversight from subject matter experts. 
For example, a contracting officer could not effectively produce a statement of work for 
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the requirement of a nursing assistant. The writing of the statement of work requires 
coordination between contracting personnel and the subject matter experts to ensure 
proper requirements definition. The subject matter experts often require some additional 
training to familiarize themselves with the acquisition process. The initiative is to have 
units and installation offices take a more active role in the acquisition of services. A 
common level of knowledge is required between program managers, contracting officers, 
customers, and the contracting officer representatives assigned to monitor the contract. In 
BBP 2.0, there is a focus on the assignment of senior management to the acquisition of 
services (Kendall, 2013). This effort addresses the need for better management of data 
and personnel. Another major focus area of BBP 2.0 is the measurement of productivity 
and prevention of requirements creep, which refers to the overlap of similar contract 
requirements that create monetary waste through redundancy (Kendall, 2013). 
Lastly, the GAO report recommends the integration of operational contract 
support. The need for entire military departments to become integrated into operational 
contracting has become evident in the past 15 years of war. The GAO calls for all 
departments to include contract support into their contingency planning. As of 2015, only 
the Army has complied. Neither BBP 2.0 nor 3.0 address this problem directly, but 
improvements in other initiatives will no doubt have a positive impact on operational 
contract support. 
DOD acquisition has shown improvement but remains on the GAO’s high-risk 
report. The importance of acquisition and contracting in the DOD has been brought to the 
forefront in this time of war, and new strategies are required to take advantage of lessons 
learned. The GAO (2015) provided the following recommendations in its report to   
• continue to improve contract management by managing the size and 
training of the workforce. 
• determine the correct mix of the workforce with regard to military, 
civilian, and contractor. 
• strategically manage the acquisition of services by utilizing goals and 
measures, and using data to monitor progress. 
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• continue the effort of operational contract integration through policy, 
planning, training, and resource management for current and future 
operations (pp. 287–292.). 
The recommendations show the historical emphasis placed on size and training of 
the workforce as well as the lack of emphasis placed on developing and managing key 
processes. The DOD inspector general (DODIG) listed process improvement as a 
recommendation in many of its reports. In its March 2015 report on contingency 
contracting, process improvement was recommended in contract administration, source 
selection, and contract pricing (Department of Defense Inspector General [DODIG], 
2015a). Its February 2015 report on contracting controls at Fort Polk drew similar 
conclusions as processes lack the maturity to be effective in the realm of contract award 
and administration (DODIG, 2015b). The emphasis that the GAO places on an action 
plan for services contracting and contract management also highlights the importance of 
not only a more educated acquisition workforce, but also more mature processes (GAO, 
2015). One method of measuring contract management process capability is the CMMM, 
which is discussed next.   
F. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY MODEL 
This research applies the CMMM to two Army contracting organizations. Rendon 
(2003) developed the CMMM as “a systematic approach to assessing and improving the 
capability maturity level of an organization’s contract management processes” (Rendon, 
2003, p. 1). This model was developed by Rendon after extensive research into previous 
models such as CMM, which focused primarily on the project management maturity 
models. Since project management and contract management are closely related, this 
provided a good starting point for developing his model. The CMMM assigns a maturity 
level from 1 through 5 to each of the key process areas in the contract management 
process. Thus, the CMMM provides both buying and selling organizations a way to 
measure and improve their contract management processes (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). 
The CMMM has been applied successfully to Air Force and Navy contracting 
organizations in past research projects such as Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
(Graham, Lewis, & Wallace, 2010) and Air Force Material Command’s (AFMC) Air 
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Logistics Center (ALC) (Burton & Nordin, 2007). The CMMM has been applied most 
recently to the following Army contracting organizations: Aberdeen Proving Ground–
Army Contracting Command (APG-ACC; Gary & Petree, 2014); Tank-Automotive and 
Armaments Command (TACOM; Rendon, 2011); and the Research, Development, and 
Engineering Command (RDECOM) contracting centers (Rendon, 2011). This research 
builds upon the existing contract management process maturity body of knowledge. The 
contract management key process areas and maturity levels are summarized as follows. 
1. Key Process Areas 
Contract management as a part of any project requires close management. 
Improvement requires the categorization of the process steps into simplified units for 
evaluation, in this case, key process areas (Garrett, 2007). Rendon’s CMMM has the 
contract management process broken down into the six key process areas whose maturity 
will be measured for the two organizations. The six key process areas are subsequently 
detailed along with key activities related to the process. 
a. Procurement Planning 
Procurement planning involves the decision making process that determines 
whether a good or service will be provided “in-house” or whether it will be contracted to 
an outside entity. Rendon (2011) broke this process down further into the following 
activities: conducting a make or buy decision, specifying the requirements, conducting 
market research, developing necessary documents to define the work to be done or made, 
defining budgetary resources and estimates, planning for type of contract to be used, and 
assessing contract risk. 
b. Solicitation Planning 
Solicitation planning is the process of specifying what exactly is needed by the 
organization and will be provided for by the contractor. This is documented in the 
statement of work. According to Rendon (2011), another key activity is determining the 
procurement method, such as sealed bidding or negotiated contracting. Other key 
activities include developing evaluation criteria and contract award strategy, developing 
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the solicitation documents, and determining contract type (Rendon, 2011). Lastly, 
solicitation planning should finalize the description of the product or service to be 
contracted (Rendon, 2011). 
c. Solicitation 
Solicitation is the process of posting the specific requirement so that contractors 
can submit their offers. The key activities include advertisement of the procurement, 
conducting optional proposal conferences, and compilation of a list of qualified bidders 
(Rendon, 2011).  
d. Source Selection 
Source selection is simply the selection of which contractor will perform the 
work. Offers are evaluated according to predetermined selection criteria, both parties 
negotiate the terms and conditions, and the contract is awarded. The key activities in this 
phase include evaluation of proposals, supplier negotiation, and award of contract 
(Rendon, 2011).  
e. Contract Administration 
Contract administration occurs as the contract as being carried out. During 
contract administration, the contractor’s work is evaluated in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the contract. The key activities include conducting a pre-performance 
conference with the contractor, evaluating and measuring the contractor’s performance 
and results, and managing the contract changes process (Rendon, 2011).  
f. Contract Closeout and Termination 
Contract closeout and termination are conducted after the work has been 
completed or when a contract is terminated. Final payments and legal issues are settled 
prior to the final closeout of the contract and performance is evaluated and documented. 
The key activities include disposition of government property, final acceptance of the 
good or service, final payment, and documenting the contractor’s performance during the 
contract (Rendon, 2011). 
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Effective contract management hinges on the completion of the key processes and 
their associated activities. Success can be attributed to a variety of best practices. 
Rendon’s (2003) CMMM listed the key process best practice areas as Process Strength, 
Successful Outcomes, Management Support, Process Integration, and Process 
Measurement. The maturity level of an organization’s processes is based on how well and 
how much these best practices are utilized in performing the key processes and activities. 
The resulting maturity levels are discussed next.   
2. Maturity Levels 
The CMMM consists of five levels of maturity. Level 1 is the lowest maturity 
level and Level 5 is the highest maturity level. The different levels of maturity are based 
on best practices within contract management and represent the nature of an 
organization’s process capability maturity (Garrett & Rendon, 2005a). It is important to 
note that each level of maturity does build upon the previous level incrementally. The 
following explains each level of maturity from Ad-Hoc to mature. 
a. Level 1: Ad-Hoc 
The Ad-Hoc level of maturity represents the lowest maturity level in the CMMM. 
At this level, the organization may understand that best practices in contract management 
processes exist, but the problem lies in their implementation and day-to-day use (Rendon, 
2008). At this level of maturity, an organization would also lack any sort of formalized, 
written standard operating procedure (SOP) for its processes (Rendon, 2008). Processes 
may be used day to day, but not with any structure or regularity. Without formalized 
processes, senior management is not held accountable for the organization’s complicities 
with any contract management standards or processes (Rendon, 2008). 
b. Level 2: Basic 
The Basic level of maturity represents the second lowest maturity level in the 
CMMM. At this level of maturity, the organization only has some basic contract 
management processes and standards in place, but may reserve the enforcement of their 
use to high visibility contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). The processes and standards 
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that exist within the organization are not recognized as being integrated into all functions. 
(Rendon, 2008). Additionally, the organization does not have policies in place that 
require personnel to use the basic contract management processes and standards that are 
in place at the Basic maturity level (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). 
c. Level 3: Structured 
The Structured level of maturity represents the middle level of maturity in the 
CMMM. At this maturity level contract management processes are “fully established, 
institutionalized, and mandated throughout the organization” (Rendon, 2008, p. 7). 
Checklists and SOPs are used by the organization as a way of formally documenting their 
contract management processes and standards (Rendon, 2008). Those at the senior 
management level play an active role “in providing guidance, direction, and approval of 
key contracting strategy, decisions, documents, and contract terms and conditions” 
(Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). Lastly, internal controls are in place to enforce the use of contract 
management processes and standards (Rendon, 2008). 
d. Level 4: Integrated 
The Integrated level of maturity represents the second highest level of maturity in 
the CMMM. Integration at this level implies that the contracting processes are “fully 
integrated with other organizational core processes such as financial management, 
schedule management, performance management, and systems engineering” (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005b, p. 3). This integration goes even further to often include the customer for 
whom they are procuring (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). The organization has gone beyond 
just having standards in place; they now have performance and efficiency metrics in 
place to make contract-related decisions (Rendon, 2008). Lastly, senior management 
understands its role and performs it well within the procurement process (Rendon, 2008). 
e. Level 5: Optimized 
The Optimized level of maturity represents the highest level of maturity in the 
CMMM, and one that all organizations should strive to achieve. At this level, all contract 
management processes are in place, and are periodically evaluated using “efficiency and 
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effectiveness” metrics and compared with new industry best practices (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005b, p. 4). The organization routinely uses lessons learned, best practices, and self-
evaluation to improve its contract management processes and standards (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005b). This level of maturity represents the most mature type of organization in 
which senior management and employees are involved in a continuous cycle of learning 
and change in an effort to constantly improve the contract management process (Garrett 
& Rendon, 2005b). 
G. PAST CMMM ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
The CMMM has previously been used to assess the contract management process 
maturity within the DOD. The CMMM has been applied most recently to the following 
Army contracting organizations: APG-ACC (Gary & Petree, 2014), TACOM (Rendon, 
2011), the RDECOM contracting centers (Rendon, 2011), and the Aviation and Missile 
Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM; Rendon, 2009). 
The results from those CMMM assessments showed that all organizations had a 
Basic maturity level in post-award contract management key process areas of contract 
administration and contract closeout, while all organizations had a higher maturity level 
in pre-award contract management key process areas of procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, and source selection. These results from Army 
contracting organizations are similar to the results from recent Navy CMMM assessment 
results from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA), and Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP; Rendon, 2015b). The 
Navy results also show higher maturity levels in pre-award contract management key 
process areas and lower maturity levels in post-award contract management key process 
areas. These results correspond to multiple DODIG and GAO reports which state 
contracting agencies do not adequately monitor and assess contractor performance 
(DODIG, 2014), that additional oversight and management of contracting techniques and 
approaches is needed (GAO, 2015), and that contracting agencies do a poor job of closing 
out contracts on time (GAO, 2012). 
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H. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a literature review of organizational assessments, which are 
used in both the private and public sectors to measure a variety of functions. In this 
chapter, we also present details of the ways in which the DOD is assessed, as well as a 
current assessment of the DOD’s contract management performance. Lastly, we detail the 
key components of the CMMM, which is the model for our thesis research. In the next 
chapter, we provide insight into the U.S. Army Contracting structure and background 
information on the two offices inside the MICC and ECC that we chose for our research. 
  
 22 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 23 
III. UNITED STATES ARMY CONTRACTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss Army contracting and set the stage for the research we 
performed. Next, we review the organizational structure of Army contracting and the 
changes to that organization under the MICC 2025 plan. We then describe the 
organizations where we conduct our research: the 410th Contracting Support Brigade 
(CSB) and 918th Contracting Battalion (CBN). Lastly, we discuss the specific missions 
and contract types managed by each organization. 
B. STATE OF ARMY CONTRACTING 
The current state of Army contracting receives a mixed assessment. On the one 
hand, the Army contracted for nearly $75 billion of goods and services in fiscal year (FY) 
2014 (U.S. Army, 2015c). On the other hand, what type of investment are taxpayers 
receiving on that money? The Army has many of the same issues that are listed in the 
GAO reports regarding the DOD in the field of acquisition and contracting to include the 
acquisition workforce and contracting techniques and approaches (GAO, 2015). For the 
purpose of this report, we address only additional issues that are specific to Army 
contracting authorities.   
Expeditionary contracting operations are the subject of many of the Army’s 
contracting issues. The Secretary of the Army established an independent commission in 
2007 to specifically investigate issues and provide recommendations within Army 
acquisition and program management in expeditionary operations (Gansler, 2007). The 
commission found five major issues in Army expeditionary contracting and described 
them as follows: 
• The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced 
military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Yet only 3 
percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there 
are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer positions. 
• The Army’s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, trained, 
structured, or empowered to meet the needs of the 21st century deployed 
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warfighters. Only 56 percent of the military officers and 53 percent of 
civilians in the contracting career field are certified for their current 
positions. 
• Notwithstanding a seven-fold workload increase and greater complexity of 
contracting, the Institutional Army is not supporting this key capability. 
• Notwithstanding there being almost as many contractor personnel in the 
Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan Theater as there are U.S. military, the 
Operational Army does not yet recognize the impact of contracting and 
contractors in expeditionary operations on mission success. 
• What should be a core competence—contracting (from requirements 
definition, through contract management, to contract closeout)—is treated 
as an operational and institutional side issue. (Gansler, 2007, p. 2) 
These issues have been addressed in part by a completely restructured contracting 
organization within the Army. 
1. Army Contracting Command 
The Army Contracting Command (ACC) was established on October 1, 2008, in 
response to the independent commission (“ACC History,” n.d.). The ACC was designed 
to be a new, unique Army organization that performs the majority of contracting support 
within the Army (“ACC History,” n.d.). Within the ACC, the Army established the 
Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) and the Expeditionary 
Contracting Command (ECC) as major subordinate commands (“ACC History,” n.d.). 
The ACC, MICC, and ECC are the main organizations that currently provide contracting 
support for goods and services for the Army. In some cases, other organizations may 
provide contract support, but for the purposes of this study, only the three aforementioned 
organizations are notable.  
The ACC is a two-star command that oversees all Army contracting activities 
(U.S. Army, 2015c). The ACC is a subordinate command of the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC) and is headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, AL. The mission of the 
ACC is to provide global contracting support to the Army and its Soldiers (U.S. Army, 
2015c). As seen in Figure 1 the ACC has five major contracting centers that primarily 
provide contracting support to the Army’s major Program Executive Offices (PEO) and 
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Program Managers (PM) which support the major acquisition programs (U.S. Army, 
2015c). These ACC offices executed more than 170,000 contracts in FY 2014 valued in 
excess of $50 billion (U.S. Army, 2015c). The ACC employs over 6,000 military and 
civilian personnel to support those contract actions worldwide (U.S. Army, 2015c). 
 ACC Organization Chart Figure 1. 
 
Source: U.S. Army. (n.d.-b). Command and staff. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from 
http://acc.army.mil/command-and-staff/ 
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2. Mission and Installation Contracting Command 
The MICC performs major contract actions for the Army and is one of two major 
subordinate commands under the ACC. The mission of the MICC is to provide “Army 
commands, installations, and activities with disciplined and responsive contracting 
solutions and oversight” (U.S. Army, 2015b, p. 1). The MICC headquarters is located at 
Joint Base San Antonio–Fort Sam Houston, TX. The MICC is composed of nearly 1,600 
military and civilian contract professionals (U.S. Army, 2015b). Those members are 
“assigned to three contracting support brigades, one field directorate office, and 33 field 
offices that provide contracting support across the Army” (see Figure 2 for MICC 
organization; U.S. Army, 2015b, p. 1). The MICC is primarily responsible for acquiring 
equipment, supplies, and services at the installation level (U.S. Army, 2015b). In 
addition, the MICC is responsible for the management of the Government Purchase Card 
(GPC) program, which is the way in which the Army makes the majority of its micro 
purchases. In total, the MICC was responsible for 37,000 contract actions valued at over 
$5.6 billion, and 633,000 GPC program transactions valued at $783 million in FY 2014 
alone (U.S. Army, 2015b). 
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 MICC Organization Chart  Figure 2. 
 
Source: A. Armstrong. (2012, February 26). Presentation to the Base Business Initiative 
(BBI) test companies, partner companies, and public [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from 
http://www.howardcountymd.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id= 6442465088 
3. Expeditionary Contracting Command 
The second subordinate command of the ACC is the ECC. The ECC’s mission is 
to provide contracting support for Army operations outside the United States (U.S. Army, 
2015a). The ECC headquarters is located at Redstone Arsenal, AL. The organization 
accomplishes its mission by employing 1,800 military and civilian contract professionals 
who are assigned to nine contracting support brigades, 17 contracting battalions, and 108 
contracting teams worldwide (see Figure 3 for ECC organization; U.S. Army, 2015a). 
The ECC is primarily responsible for goods and services in direct support of full 
spectrum military operations during contingency operations. The ECC currently supports 
180 expeditionary missions in 52 different countries, which resulted in 29,000 contract 
actions valued at more than $1.75 billion in FY 2014 (U.S. Army, 2015a).  
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 ECC Organization Chart Figure 3. 
 
Source: U.S. Army. (n.d.-a). About ECC. Retrieved June 14, 2015, from 
http://acc.army.mil/ecc/about/ 
4. Mission and Installation Contracting Command 2025 
As part of this research, it is important to note the ongoing change within the 
MICC organization. MICC 2025 is a change of organization structure and responsibilities 
in an effort to produce personnel cost savings, increase competition with contracts, and 
improve personnel turnover rates (Gabbert, 2015). This plan is centered around three 
major organizational shifts to produce those outcomes: the organization of six main 
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contracting centers and 26 satellite offices, the reorganization between contract 
specialists (GS-1102) and purchasing agents (GS-1105), and change of contracting 
responsibilities among the center offices (Gabbert, 2015). 
The MICC was previously organized into small, medium, and large offices based 
on historical workload. With the MICC 2025 plan, there would only be six full service 
contracting offices: Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA; Fort Knox, KY; Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, WA; Joint Base San Antonio–Fort Sam Houston, TX; Fort Hood, TX; and Fort 
Bragg, NC (Gabbert, 2015). These offices would provide all contracting support to the 
satellite offices for procurements over $150,000 per action or $5,500,000 for commercial 
items. The remaining 26 offices would be considered satellite offices that only handle 
simple procurements under $150,000 per action or $5,500,000 for commercial items 
(Gabbert, 2015).  
Changing the organization structure and responsibilities of each office forced the 
third major change: the reorganization of contract specialists and purchasing agents. In 
the old MICC structure, contract specialists were involved in much of the workload on 
contract actions less than $150,000 (Gabbert, 2015). Those actions, however, were 
typically simple and did not require the expertise of a contract specialist. The result was 
higher overhead rates than what would be expected for simple contract actions (Gabbert, 
2015). MICC 2025 addresses this concern by shifting all simple actions under the 
previously discussed threshold to satellite offices, thereby eliminating the need for so 
many contract specialists. MICC 2025 would convert 250 contract specialist positions to 
purchasing agents to address the new responsibilities of satellite offices (Gabbert, 2015). 
The end benefits result in an immediate savings of $11,100,000 a year and potential 
future savings of $17,900,000 per year (Gabbert, 2015). These savings are mostly due to 
the difference in pay between contract specialists (GS-11) and purchasing agents (GS-7).   
The procedural and structural changes related to MICC 2025 result in more 
specialization at each of the six main contracting centers and 26 satellite offices. The six 
main contracting centers will be able to specialize in larger procurements as their focus 
will be on larger, more complex contracts—such as new facility construction—within 
their regions. This high level of specification can lead to a higher process maturity due to 
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the repetition of similar contract actions. The same can be stated for the 26 satellite 
offices that specialize in smaller, less complex procurements, such as janitorial services 
or grounds maintenance, which can lead to higher maturity of their processes due to the 
high repetition of those actions.  
5. 410th Contracting Support Brigade 
The 410th CSB is a subordinate command of the ECC; its mission is to provide 
“contracting support to Army South and U.S. Southern Command in support of Army 
and Joint Operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations” (Harger, 2015, 
p. 5). Its headquarters is located at Fort Sam Houston, TX. This office was selected for 
the study because its structure is similar to MICC organization prior to MICC 2025 
changes. This will assist our research assessing the maturity of contract management 
processes at each type of organization for comparison purposes. 
The 410th CSB has a typical top-down hierarchical structure similar to most 
military organizations and other CSBs within the ECC. The 410th CSB has five regional 
contracting offices and one contingency contracting battalion under its command, which 
can be seen in Figure 4 (Harger, 2015). Most of the work in the CSB is performed by 
contract specialists and purchasing agents resulting in an extremely bottom-heavy 
personnel load. The 410th CSB currently comprises 100 military and civilian contracting 
personnel who help service its customers’ needs (J. S. Ortiz, personal communication, 
August 13, 2015). The 410th CSB and ECC organizations are unique in their ability to 
perform rapid deployment operations (Harger, 2015). The 410th CSB has a 40 Soldier 
Rapid Response Deployable Detachment (R2D2) ready to deploy within 72 hours in 
support of a Joint Task Force (JTF; Harger, 2015). Additionally, the 410th CSB 
maintains a pool of two deployable Contingency Contracting Teams (CCTs) that can 
deploy in support of any USSOUTHCOM contingency operation (Harger, 2015). 
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 410th CSB Organization Structure Figure 4. 
 
 
Source: Harger, D. (2015). 410th contracting support brigade command brief 
[Unpublished presentation slides]. 
A brief overview of the 410th CSB customers and current operations shows a 
diverse customer and mission base. Its primary mission is to support contingency and 
expeditionary operations in USSOUTHCOM area of operations. Its customer base 
includes 7th Special Operations Group, foreign partnered governments, United States 
Navy, and many other agencies (Harger, 2015). The 410th CSB also supports worldwide 
operations to include Operation Fuerzas Commando (Columbia), Operation Fused 
Response (Belize), Operation Fuerzas Humanitarias (El Salvador), and several other key 
forward operations (Harger, 2015). It supported 5,200 personnel, obligated $6.4 million, 
and executed 170 contract actions in support of mission operations in FY 2014 alone 
(Harger, 2015). The 410th CSBs’ mission load is much smaller in terms of the number of 
contract actions and dollars obligated than an MICC organization, but it supports a wider 
range of contracting activities.  
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6. 918th Contracting Battalion 
The 918th CBN is a subordinate command of 418th CSB, and both commands are 
subordinate to the one-star command of the overarching MICC. The 918th CBN’s  
mission is to provide contract support for goods and services to units assigned to Fort 
Carson and units utilizing the Piñon Canyon Maneuver site (PP MICC/FC; McFall, 
2015). The 418th CBN office is considered a satellite office under MICC 2025, and its 
headquarters is located at Fort Carson, CO. It was chosen as one of the offices to apply 
the CMMM because it is the furthest along in the MICC 2025 plan, and likely to have the 
most mature contracting process within the MICC.  
The 918th CBN is organized into a top-down hierarchy as seen in Figure 5. This 
structure is typical in the MICC 2025 format where individual teams are separated into 
two divisions: the mission contracting division and installation contracting division. The 
mission contracting division generally supports mission requirements such as aircraft 
maintenance, communications equipment and services, and small purchases using 
government purchase cards. The installation contracting division generally provides base 
contracting support for organizations such as Directorate of Public Works and the 
Logistics Readiness Center for items such as elevator maintenance, commissary 
repurposing, and information technology support services. This organization format 
includes an extremely bottom-heavy personnel load much like the 410th CSB, as most of 
the work is accomplished by contract specialists and purchasing agents. The 918th CBN 
currently comprises 28 uniformed service members and 22 civilian contracting personnel 
who support its daily contracting operations. 
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 918th CBN Organization Structure Figure 5. 
Source: McFall, T. (2015). 918th CBN/MICC-FC organizational overview 
[Unpublished presentation slides]. 
A brief overview of the 918th CBN customers and current operations shows a 
diverse customer and mission base. The 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson Garrison 
Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group, 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, and the 71st 
Ordnance Group are a few of the major customers served by the 918th (McFall, 2015). 
The 918th CBN also supports worldwide operations to include Operation Atlantic 
Resolve (Ukraine), Operation Observant Compass (Uganda), Special Operations 
Command Central, several National Training Center rotations (Fort Irwin), and several 
other key forward operations (McFall, 2015). As with most Army contracting 
organizations, the 918th CBN has seen a steady decrease in contract actions due to the 
current budget constraints and the drawdown in contingency operations worldwide. Its 
customers and missions have resulted in nearly 3,800 contract actions since FY 2012 (see 
Table 1). Its diverse mission and heavy contract load makes the 918th CBN a good 
candidate organization for assessment using the CMMM.  
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Table 1.   Contract Actions Per Fiscal Year 
 
Source: McFall, T. (2015). 918th CBN/MICC-FC organizational overview 
[Unpublished presentation slides]. 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed the state of Army contracting and the Gansler 
commission. We then explained the organization of the ACC and its two subordinate 
major commands of the ECC and MICC. Next, we analyzed the MICC 2025 plan and the 
changes that it has sought to implement within the MICC to address current contracting 
challenges. Lastly, we gave a brief history, mission, and organization structure of both 
the 918th CBN and 410th CSB, the organizations involved in our research. The next 




IV. ASSESSMENT RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the results from the CMMM assessment conducted at the 
410th CSB and the 918th CBN. First, we discuss the selection of the study participants 
and the administration of the CMMM survey. Next, we analyze the survey responses and 
assign a maturity level to each key process area for both organizations based on the 
survey results. We then provide an analysis of each contract management key process 
area for both organizations. Lastly, we provide recommendations for process 
improvement opportunities for both organizations. 
B. SELECTION OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
This research used a purposeful sampling method in which the CMMM survey 
was deployed only to DAWIA Level II and Level III certified 1102s and military 
equivalents who are directly involved in their organization’s contracting processes. Level 
II and III certified respondents possess the knowledge and experience necessary to 
provide valid answers to the survey questions. Respondents with less experience in 
contract management, and therefore in their organization’s contract management 
processes, are less likely to have the insight necessary to accurately answer the CMMM 
survey questions. Despite our efforts, it was found that the survey was deployed to and 
answered by several less experienced Level I personnel. Those responses were deleted 
from the analysis to maintain the validity of the research. Selection of study participants 
was the first step in the deployment of the survey, which is covered in the next section. 
C. DEPLOYMENT OF THE CMMM SURVEY 
The CMMM survey was deployed electronically to the 410th CSB and 918th 
CBN in August 2015 and remained opened for 19 days. The volunteers were asked to 
answer a 62-question survey that assessed the contract management process capability at 
their organization. The responses were compiled and analyzed following the survey’s 
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closure. Then a process maturity level was calculated for each contract management key 
process area using the conversion table listed in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Maturity Level Conversion Table 
 
 
D. SURVEY RESULTS AT 410TH CSB 
There were a total of 53 eligible survey participants within the 410th CSB. There 
were 21 total responses, which provide an overall response rate of 40%. Table 3 provides 
a further breakdown of the demographic data from each organization to include response 
rates, number of warranted respondents, level of DAWIA certification, and years of 
experience.  


















10 Question Conversion Table (50 points)













≤ 3 = 1
4 to 8 = 8
9 to 13 = 5
14 to 18 = 2
 ≥ 18 = 5
21 11 4 17
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Table 4 provides the mean scores and standard deviations from the survey 
responses for each contract management key process area. The mean scores were applied 
to Table 2 for a contract management process maturity level determination.   








Number Key Process Area Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
1.1 Procurement Planning 3.81 1.63 2.1 Solicitation Planning 4.10 1.34
1.2 Procurement Planning 3.57 1.75 2.2 Solicitation Planning 3.48 1.63
1.3 Procurement Planning 3.43 1.57 2.3 Solicitation Planning 3.86 1.35
1.4 Procurement Planning 3.29 1.49 2.4 Solicitation Planning 3.95 1.12
1.5 Procurement Planning 3.71 1.49 2.5 Solicitation Planning 3.71 1.19
1.6 Procurement Planning 3.43 1.54 2.6 Solicitation Planning 3.43 1.50
1.7 Procurement Planning 3.14 1.56 2.7 Solicitation Planning 3.14 1.59
1.8 Procurement Planning 3.29 1.55 2.8 Solicitation Planning 3.43 1.08
1.9 Procurement Planning 3.10 1.84 2.9 Solicitation Planning 3.10 1.84
1.10 Procurement Planning 3.33 1.62 2.10 Solicitation Planning 3.48 1.36
Mean Total 34.10 35.67
Question 




Number Key Process Area
Mean Standard 
Deviation
3.1 Solicitation 3.40 1.64 4.1 Source Selection 3.80 1.44
3.2 Solicitation 3.20 1.77 4.2 Source Selection 3.35 1.84
3.3 Solicitation 3.55 1.61 4.3 Source Selection 3.50 1.85
3.4 Solicitation 3.40 1.47 4.4 Source Selection 3.85 1.50
3.5 Solicitation 3.50 1.54 4.5 Source Selection 3.90 1.29
3.6 Solicitation 3.15 1.50 4.6 Source Selection 3.60 1.57
3.7 Solicitation 3.05 1.54 4.7 Source Selection 4.10 1.25
3.8 Solicitation 3.10 1.41 4.8 Source Selection 3.75 1.45
3.9 Solicitation 2.80 1.77 4.9 Source Selection 3.45 1.39
3.10 Solicitation 3.10 1.59 4.10 Source Selection 3.05 1.90
4.11 Source Selection 3.55 1.36
Mean Total 39.90
Question 




Number Key Process Area
Mean Standard 
Deviation
5.1 Contract Administration 3.80 1.36 6.1 Contract Closeout 3.60 1.50
5.2 Contract Administration 3.85 1.39 6.2 Contract Closeout 3.20 1.61
5.3 Contract Administration 3.90 1.37 6.3 Contract Closeout 3.35 1.35
5.4 Contract Administration 3.50 1.54 6.4 Contract Closeout 3.80 1.51
5.5 Contract Administration 3.65 1.31 6.5 Contract Closeout 2.80 1.74
5.6 Contract Administration 3.85 1.31 6.6 Contract Closeout 3.00 1.45
5.7 Contract Administration 3.10 1.65 6.7 Contract Closeout 3.20 1.54
5.8 Contract Administration 3.35 1.46 6.8 Contract Closeout 2.80 1.77
5.9 Contract Administration 2.10 1.97 6.9 Contract Closeout 3.45 1.43
5.10 Contract Administration 3.30 1.72 6.10 Contract Closeout 2.60 1.79
5.11 Contract Administration 3.45 1.43 Mean Total 31.80
Mean Total 37.85






1. 410th CSB Contract Management Process Maturity 
The resulting contract management process maturity level for the 410th CSB can 
be seen in Figure 6. The maturity level for all contract management key process areas is 
Basic. Further analysis of these findings is detailed in the following section. 




a. Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source 
Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout 
The 410th CSB’s contract management process areas of procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract 
closeout were found to be at the Basic level of maturity. At this level of maturity, the 
organization only has some basic contract management processes and standards in place, 
but may reserve the enforcement of their use to high visibility contracts (Garrett & 
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Rendon, 2005b). The processes and standards that exist within the organization are not 
recognized as being integrated into all functions (Rendon, 2008). Additionally, the 
organization does not have policies in place that require personnel to use the basic 
contract management processes and standards that are in place at the Basic maturity level 
(Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). It should be noted that the mean score totals for the key 
process area of source selection is at the high end of the Basic maturity level and very 
near the Structured maturity level. 
E. SURVEY RESULTS AT 918TH CBN 
There were a total of 26 eligible survey participants within the 918th CBN. There 
were 14 total responses, which provide an overall response rate of 54%. Table 5 provides a 
further breakdown of the demographic data from each organization to include response rates, 
number of warranted respondents, level of DAWIA certification, and years of experience. 
Table 5.   918th CBN Response Demographics 
 
 
Table 6 provides the mean scores and standard deviations from the survey 
responses for each contract management key process area. The mean scores were applied 
to Table 2 for a contract management process maturity level determination.   
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Number Key Process Area Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
1.1 Procurement Planning 3.71 1.59 2.1 Solicitation Planning 4.29 1.27
1.2 Procurement Planning 3.50 1.56 2.2 Solicitation Planning 3.57 1.87
1.3 Procurement Planning 3.29 1.64 2.3 Solicitation Planning 3.57 1.45
1.4 Procurement Planning 3.21 1.25 2.4 Solicitation Planning 3.79 1.37
1.5 Procurement Planning 3.86 1.29 2.5 Solicitation Planning 3.71 1.27
1.6 Procurement Planning 3.71 1.49 2.6 Solicitation Planning 3.50 1.61
1.7 Procurement Planning 3.57 1.22 2.7 Solicitation Planning 3.64 1.39
1.8 Procurement Planning 3.29 1.64 2.8 Solicitation Planning 3.14 1.79
1.9 Procurement Planning 3.07 1.73 2.9 Solicitation Planning 3.07 1.86
1.10 Procurement Planning 2.86 1.51 2.10 Solicitation Planning 3.36 1.60
Mean Total 34.07 35.64
Question 




Number Key Process Area
Mean Standard 
Deviation
3.1 Solicitation 3.43 1.34 4.1 Source Selection 3.92 1.44
3.2 Solicitation 2.79 1.72 4.2 Source Selection 3.25 1.76
3.3 Solicitation 3.00 1.57 4.3 Source Selection 3.25 1.82
3.4 Solicitation 3.43 1.34 4.4 Source Selection 4.08 1.44
3.5 Solicitation 3.57 1.60 4.5 Source Selection 4.00 1.48
3.6 Solicitation 3.21 1.81 4.6 Source Selection 3.92 1.44
3.7 Solicitation 3.29 1.77 4.7 Source Selection 4.08 1.38
3.8 Solicitation 3.14 1.41 4.8 Source Selection 3.75 1.86
3.9 Solicitation 3.00 1.71 4.9 Source Selection 3.58 1.83
3.10 Solicitation 3.14 1.35 4.10 Source Selection 3.08 1.83
4.11 Source Selection 3.17 1.80
Mean Total 40.08
Question 




Number Key Process Area
Mean Standard 
Deviation
5.1 Contract Administration 3.75 1.14 6.1 Contract Closeout 4.00 0.95
5.2 Contract Administration 3.67 1.07 6.2 Contract Closeout 3.75 1.14
5.3 Contract Administration 3.58 1.00 6.3 Contract Closeout 3.92 0.90
5.4 Contract Administration 3.67 0.78 6.4 Contract Closeout 4.33 0.89
5.5 Contract Administration 3.50 1.68 6.5 Contract Closeout 3.58 1.78
5.6 Contract Administration 3.67 1.61 6.6 Contract Closeout 3.42 1.56
5.7 Contract Administration 3.67 1.37 6.7 Contract Closeout 3.75 1.14
5.8 Contract Administration 3.17 1.53 6.8 Contract Closeout 3.33 1.61
5.9 Contract Administration 2.33 2.06 6.9 Contract Closeout 3.33 1.56
5.10 Contract Administration 3.08 1.83 6.10 Contract Closeout 2.83 1.99








1. 918th CBN Contract Management Process Maturity 
The resulting contract management process maturity level for the 918th CBN can 
be seen in Figure 7. The maturity level for all contract management key process areas is 
Basic. Further analysis of these findings is detailed in the following section. 




a. Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source 
Selection, Contract Administration, and Contract Closeout 
The 918th CBN’s contract management key process areas of procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and 
contract closeout were also found to be at the Basic level of maturity. At this level of 
maturity, the organization only has some basic contract management processes and 
standards in place, but may reserve the enforcement of their use to high visibility 
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contracts (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). The processes and standards that exist within the 
organization are not recognized as being integrated into all functions. (Rendon, 2008). 
Additionally, the organization does not have policies in place that require personnel to 
use the basic contract management processes and standards that are in place at the Basic 
maturity level (Garrett & Rendon, 2005b). It should be noted that the mean score totals 
for the key process areas of source selection and contract closeout are at the high end of 
the Basic maturity level and very near the Structured maturity level. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
IMPROVEMENT 
This section evaluates the maturity levels assigned from the CMMM survey 
results and provides recommendations for improvement in each contract management key 
process area. Given that the maturity levels were the same for every process area across 
both organizations, the recommendations are also the same across organizations.   
1. Procurement Planning 
Procurement planning was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th 
CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the 
contract management processes involving procurement planning must be fully 
institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases 
(Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures 
and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The 
tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique 
contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes 
include key activities such as conducting requirements analysis and definition, market 
research, developing a preliminary budget, schedule, and work statement, and 
preliminary consideration of procurement method and contract type (Rendon, 2015a).  
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2. Solicitation Planning 
Solicitation planning was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th 
CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the 
contract management processes involving solicitation planning must be fully 
institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases 
(Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures 
and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The 
tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique 
contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes 
include key activities such as preparation of the solicitation document, documentation of 
program requirements, and identification of potential sources (Rendon, 2015a). 
Determination of contract type, procurement method, evaluation criteria and contract 
award strategy are also part of solicitation planning as the terms and conditions are 
structured and the work statement is finalized (Rendon, 2015a). 
3. Solicitation 
Solicitation was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN and 
the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the contract 
management processes involving solicitation must be fully institutionalized, established, 
and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only 
should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, but some of 
the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of processes and 
documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). 
According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing guidance, 
direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents and terms 
and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities such as 
conducting solicitation conferences, site visits, advertising the procurement opportunity, 
and maintaining a qualified offerors list (Rendon, 2015a). 
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4. Source Selection 
Source selection was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN 
and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the 
contract management processes involving source selection must be fully institutionalized, 
established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases (Rendon, 2015a). 
Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures and processes, 
but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The tailoring of 
processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique contracts (Rendon, 
2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be involved in providing 
guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, documents 
and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes include key activities 
such as receiving and evaluating proposals, conducting negotiations, awarding the 
contract, and documenting the contract agreement (Rendon, 2015a). 
5. Contract Administration 
Contract administration was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 
918th CBN and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both 
organizations, the contract management processes involving contract administration must 
be fully institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on 
special cases (Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support 
the procedures and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 
2015a). The tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate 
unique contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes 
include key activities such as conducting a pre-performance conference, performing 
contractor surveillance, monitoring and measuring contractor performance, processing 
contractor payments, and managing changes to the contract (Rendon, 2015a).  
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6. Contract Closeout 
Contract closeout was assessed as being at the Basic level for both the 918th CBN 
and the 410th CSB. In order to improve the maturity level of both organizations, the 
contract management processes involving contract closeout must be fully 
institutionalized, established, and mandated rather than being used only on special cases 
(Rendon, 2015a). Not only should documentation be developed to support the procedures 
and processes, but some of the processes could be automated (Rendon, 2015a). The 
tailoring of processes and documents should be permitted to accommodate unique 
contracts (Rendon, 2015a). According to Rendon, “senior management should be 
involved in providing guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, 
decisions, documents and terms and conditions” (Rendon, 2015a, p. 19). These processes 
include key activities such as conducting the final acceptance of the supplies or service, 
which leads to processing the final payment to the contractor (Rendon, 2015a). 
Conducting property disposition, documenting contractor performance and lessons 
learned are also performed during contract closeout (Rendon, 2015a).  
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the results from the CMMM assessment conducted at the 
410th CSB and the 918th CBN. Analysis of each contract management process area was 
conducted for both organizations. We then assigned specific maturity levels to each key 
process area for both organizations, and finally provided opportunities for process 
improvement for both organizations. In the next chapter, we provide a summary and 
conclusion of our research, and identify recommendations for further research. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we summarize our research, discuss our conclusions by answering 
our research questions, and identify recommendations for further research. 
B. SUMMARY 
DOD contracting has been a hot button issue for over 20 years, as shown by its 
placement on the GAO’s High Risk List each year since 1992 (GAO, 2015). The 
increased operational tempo, a changing fiscal environment, and sequestration have only 
added pressure on the acquisition workforce. The addition of employee turnover to the 
existing pressure can cause a loss of knowledge within the workforce. The typical 
responses to the issues identified by the GAO are additional training for the acquisition 
workforce and additional acquisition personnel (GAO, 2015). However, what is missing 
in the DOD’s response is a focus on contract management process capability. Improving 
organizational contract management processes is another way to address the ongoing 
issues in DOD contracting. The Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) is a 
way to measure the maturity of organizations’ contracting processes. 
The purpose of this research was to assess the maturity level of the contract 
management key process areas at the 918th CBN and the 410th CSB using the CMMM. 
The CMMM results provided us with a way to assess the process maturity of each 
contract management key process areas and provide recommendations for improvement. 
Next, we provide answers to our research questions based on the results of the CMMM 
survey and identify recommendations for further research.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The conclusions of this research are provided by answering our research 
questions: 
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1. What is the contract management process maturity level for the 918th 
Contracting Battalion in each of the six contract management process 
areas? 
The results of the CMMM, as shown in Figure 7 of Chapter IV, show that all of 
the contract management key process areas for the 918th CBN are functioning at a Basic 
maturity level. The 918th CBN should focus its resources on steadily improving all of the 
contract management key process areas to the next higher maturity level of Structured. 
2. What is the contract maturity level for the 410th Contracting Support 
Brigade in each of the six contract management process areas? 
The results of the CMMM, as shown in Figure 6 of Chapter IV, show that all of 
the contract management key process areas for the 410th CSB are functioning at a Basic 
maturity level. The 410th CSB should focus its resources on steadily improving all of the 
contract management key process areas to the next higher maturity level of Structured. 
3. What opportunities for process improvement are available for the 
410th Contracting Support Brigade and the 918th Contracting 
Battalion based on the CMMM assessment results? 
The assessment results indicate both the 410th CSB and the 918th CBN have 
much room for improvement in the process maturity of their contract management key 
process areas. They should focus key resources on improving all of the contracting 
management key process areas by developing contract management processes and 
standards throughout their organization, providing formal documentation for these key 
processes and standards, and ensuring internal controls are in place to enforce these 
contract management processes and standards. By focusing key resources on 
implementing the previously mentioned recommendations, both organizations have the 
ability to attain the next higher maturity level of Structured in all of the contract 
management key process areas. 
4. Are the MICC 2025 changes being implemented within Army 
contracting having an impact on contract management process 
maturity? 
The results of the CMMM assessment show that neither organization has more 
mature contract management processes than the other. This indicates three possibilities: 
that the changes in MICC 2025 have not had enough time to take effect, that the CMMM 
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survey was not the most effective way to measure the changes resulting from MICC 
2025, or that MICC 2025 does not impact the contract management key process areas 
maturity level. Our conclusion, based on our research and CMMM results, is that given 
more time, the changes implemented in MICC 2025 should improve the process maturity 
of the contract management key process areas. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We recommend the three following areas for additional research. First, conduct 
the CMMM assessment for the entire Army Contracting Command (ACC). This type of 
assessment would not only be valuable in assessing the process maturity of the contract 
management key process areas, but provide valuable insight into the MICC 2025 
changes. Second, compare and evaluate research results from other ACCs’ CMMM 
results in order to implement best practices and information sharing. This would help 
create an environment of constant improvement and would be extremely valuable in 
improving all contracting organizations within the Army. Lastly, perform a follow-up 
assessment using the CMMM at both the 918th CBN and 410th CSB at a future time 
when both MICC 2025 changes and CMMM recommendations have been fully 
implemented. Additional assessments should be scheduled by both organizations’ 
leadership so that the organizations can monitor and track the progress of the maturity 
level of their contract management key processes. This allows both organizations’ 
leadership to strive for a continuous cycle of learning and improvement, a key component 
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APPENDIX A. DOD STRATEGIC GOAL 5: MEASURES/RESULTS 
 
Source: Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO]. (2014). 
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